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Abstract We study in detail and explicitly solve the version of Kyle’s model in-
troduced in a specific case in Back and Baruch (Econometrica 72:433–465, 2004),
where the trading horizon is given by an exponentially distributed random time. The
first part of the paper is devoted to the analysis of time-homogeneous equilibria us-
ing tools from the theory of one-dimensional diffusions. It turns out that such an
equilibrium is only possible if the final payoff is Bernoulli distributed as in Back and
Baruch (Econometrica 72:433–465, 2004). We show in the second part that the signal
the market makers use in the general case is a time-changed version of the one they
would have used had the final payoff had a Bernoulli distribution. In both cases, we
characterise explicitly the equilibrium price process and the optimal strategy of the
informed trader. In contrast to the original Kyle model, it is found that the reciprocal
of the market’s depth, i.e., Kyle’s lambda, is a uniformly integrable supermartingale.
While Kyle’s lambda is a potential, i.e., converges to 0, for the Bernoulli-distributed
final payoff, its limit in general is different from 0.
Keywords Kyle’s model · Financial equilibrium · One-dimensional diffusions ·
h-transform · Potential theory
Mathematics Subject Classification (2010) 60J45 · 60J60 · 91B44
JEL Classification D82 · G12 · G14
1 Introduction
The canonical model of markets with asymmetric information is due to Kyle [13].
Kyle studies a market for a single risky asset whose price is determined in equilib-
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rium. There are mainly three types of agents that constitute the market: a strategic
risk-neutral informed trader with a private information regarding the future value of
the asset, non-strategic uninformed noise traders, and a number of risk-neutral market
makers competing for the net demand from the strategic and non-strategic traders.
The key feature of this model is that the asset value becomes public knowledge at
a fixed deterministic date and the market makers cannot distinguish the informed
trades from the uninformed ones, but ‘learn’ from the net demand by ‘filtering’ what
the informed trader knows, which is ‘corrupted’ by the noise demand. The private
information of the informed trader is static, i.e., it is obtained at the beginning of
trading and does not change over time. The nature of this information is not really
important: It could be inside information about the future payoff of the asset or an un-
biased estimator of the future payoff. The latter is a more suitable interpretation when
the strategic informed trader is a big investment bank with a good research division
producing sophisticated research that is not shared with the public.
Kyle’s model is in discrete time and assumes that the noise traders follow a ran-
dom walk and the future payoff of the asset has a normal distribution. This has been
extended to a continuous-time framework with general payoffs by Back [1]. In this
extension, the total demand of the noise traders is given by a Brownian motion and the
future payoff of the asset has a general continuous distribution, while the informed
trader’s private information is still static. Kyle’s model and its continuous-time exten-
sion by Back have been further extended to allow multiple informed traders [11, 3],
to include default risk [6] or to the case when the single informed trader receives a
continuous signal as private information [4, 7].
Our first goal in this paper is to study a time-homogeneous version of this model
introduced by Back and Baruch in [2]. The time-homogeneity refers to the SDE cor-
responding to the market price having time-homogeneous coefficients, and to the
insider’s optimal decisions depending only on the price of the traded asset, not on
time. This is in part due to the assumption that the asset value Γ is announced at a
random exponential time τ with mean r−1 for some r > 0 and independent from all
other variables in the model. The informed trader knows the asset value but not τ .
Thus, she has an informational advantage over the other traders; however, this can
end at any time since τ will come as a surprise to the informed trader as it does to the
others. Back and Baruch compute the market depth and the informed trader’s strat-
egy as a function of the price, which is only characterised implicitly using an inverse
operation. Moreover, their method does not allow an explicit characterisation of the
distribution of the equilibrium price process.
In Sect. 3.1, we analyse the model of Back and Baruch using tools from the the-
ory of one-dimensional diffusions. We show that in equilibrium the market makers
construct a transient Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process Y that they use for pricing. A par-
ticular consequence of this is that the pricing rule becomes a scale function of Y .
In addition, we identify the value function of the strategic trader with an r-excessive
function of a certain h-transform of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process.
Back and Baruch postulate the equilibrium controls for the market makers and
the informed trader and then verify that these indeed constitute an equilibrium. We,
on the other hand, study in detail the admissible pricing rules for the market makers
given a large class of admissible strategies of the informed trader, and we characterise
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the ones that can appear in equilibrium. It turns out that the market makers can choose
from a continuum of controls in equilibrium; however, every such choice will lead to
the same SDE for the equilibrium price process.
Consistent with what was observed earlier by Back and Baruch, we show that the
process measuring the price impact of trades, i.e., Kyle’s lambda, is a uniformly inte-
grable supermartingale converging to 0, i.e., a potential. As a result, the market gets
more liquid on average as time passes. This is a deviation from Kyle [13] who pre-
dicted that Kyle’s lambda must follow a martingale preventing ‘systematic changes’
in the market depth as explained in [3] and [9]. In the absence of such systematic
changes, the insider cannot acquire a large position when the depth is low to liquidate
at a later date when the liquidity is higher to obtain unbounded profits. In the model
we study, even if the market gets more liquid as time passes, there are no opportuni-
ties for the informed trader to make infinite profits since the market can end on any
time interval [t, t + dt] with probability r dt .
One of the advantages of the approach used in this paper is that it identifies the
distribution of the price process explicitly. The explicit form of the solutions, how-
ever, also indicate that one cannot have an equilibrium where the price process is a
time-homogeneous diffusion if the asset value has a non-Bernoulli distribution, as
explained in Remark 3.11. A recent work by Collin-Dufresne et al. [8], on the other
hand, hints at the direction that one should follow for a general payoff distribution.
Collin-Dufresne et al. [8], using linear Kalman filtering, study a version of the Kyle
model where the announcement date is a jump time of a Poisson process with non-
constant intensity and the asset value has a Gaussian distribution. It turns out in their
model that the diffusion coefficient of the SDE for the equilibrium price should be
time-dependent.
Motivated by their result, we study in Sect. 3.2 an extension of the model of Back
and Baruch to a large class of payoff distributions. It turns out that the signal the mar-
ket makers use when the payoff has a general distribution is a time-changed transient
Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. The time change V is deterministic with V (∞) < ∞.
The finiteness of the time change implies that the limiting distribution of the market
makers’ signal is a non-degenerate normal distribution. This particular feature allows
us to extend the model of Back and Baruch to a much more general setting, including
the normally distributed case considered in [8].
As in the other works on the Kyle model, we establish that the informed trader’s
trades are inconspicuous in equilibrium. That is, the equilibrium distribution of the
total demand is the same as that of cumulative noise trades. An essential difference,
on the other hand, from the earlier works on this subject is that the equilibrium prices
exhibit a jump at the announcement date τ . This is only natural since τ is unknown
to the informed trader, and thus there is no strategy to ensure that the market price
converges almost surely to Γ as time approaches τ , which is a totally inaccessible
stopping time even for the informed. However, what the informed trader can do is the
following strategy, which will in fact turn out to be her equilibrium strategy: She can
make sure that Pt , the market price conditioned on survival, i.e., {τ > t}, converges
to Γ as t → ∞. That is, conditioned on indefinite survival, market prices converge
to the true payoff. Note that indefinite survival has 0 probability due to the finiteness
of τ ; hence a jump in prices at time τ occurs with probability 1.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the model, defines the
admissible controls for the market makers, as well as the informed trader, and ends
with a characterisation of the market makers’ pricing choice. The equilibrium when
the final payoff has a Bernoulli and a general distribution is solved in Sects. 3.1 and
3.2, respectively. Finally, Sect. 4 concludes.
2 The setup
Let (Ω,F , (Ft )t≥0,P) be a filtered probability space satisfying the usual conditions
of right-continuity and P-completeness. We suppose that F0 is not trivial and there
exists an F0-measurable random variable Γ taking values in R. Moreover, the filtered
probability space also supports a standard Brownian motion B with B0 = 0, and thus
B is independent of Γ . We also assume the existence of an F -measurable random
variable τ , which is independent of F∞ and has an exponential distribution with
mean 0 < r−1 < ∞. In particular, τ is independent of Γ and B .
The measure induced by Γ on R will be denoted by ν, i.e., ν(A) := P[Γ ∈ A]
for any Borel subset of R. We further assume the existence of a family of probability
measures (Pv)v∈R such that we have the disintegration formula
P[E] =
∫
R
P
v[E]ν(dv), ∀E ∈F . (2.1)
The existence of such a family is easily justified when we consider Ω =R×C(R+,R),
where C(R+,R) is the space of real-valued continuous functions on R+. We set
P
v = P if v /∈ supp(ν). We also assume that Γ is square-integrable, that is,
E[Γ ] =
∫
R
v2ν(dv) < ∞. (2.2)
We consider a market in which the risk-free interest rate is set to 0 and a single
risky asset is traded. The fundamental value of this asset equals Γ , which will be
announced at the random time τ .
There are three types of agents that interact in this market:
(i) Liquidity traders who trade for reasons exogenous to the model and whose
cumulative demand at time t is given by Bt .
(ii) A single informed trader, who knows Γ from time t = 0 onwards, and is risk-
neutral. We call the informed trader insider in what follows and denote her cumulative
demand at time t by θt . The filtration GI of the insider is generated by observing the
price Γ of the risky asset and whether the announcement has been made, that is,
whether τ > t or not for each t ≥ 0. The filtration is also assumed to be completed
with the nullsets of (Pv)v∈R.
(iii) Market makers observe only the net demand X = B + θ of the risky asset,
whether τ > t or not for each t ≥ 0, and Γ when it is made public at τ . Thus, their fil-
tration GM is the minimal right-continuous filtration generated by X, (1{τ>t})t≥0 and
(1{t≥τ }Γ )t≥0, and completed with the P-nullsets. In particular, τ is a GM -stopping
time. The price process chosen by the market makers is denoted by S. Obviously,
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St = Γ on the set {t ≥ τ }. Prior to the announcement date, we assume that the mar-
ket price is determined according to a Bertrand competition: Market makers make
their price offers and the investors trade with the one offering the best quote. This
mechanism results in S being a GM -martingale, i.e., St = E[Γ |GMt ]. Consequently,
S∞ exists and equals Γ since P[τ < ∞] = 1.
The way that the price process is determined yields the following since Γ is inte-
grable.
Proposition 2.1 In view of the condition (2.2), for any s ≥ 0,
lim
t→∞E
[|St − Γ |∣∣GMs ] = 0. (2.3)
Proof Since limt→∞ St = Γ and Γ satisfies (2.2), we deduce that the family (St )t≥0
is uniformly integrable (see [12, Problem 1.3.20]), and so is (Γ − St )t≥0. Since
limt→∞ |St − Γ | = 0, the claim follows. 
In this paper, as in all other past work on Kyle’s model, we are interested in Marko-
vian Nash equilibria. In line with the current literature, we assume that the price cho-
sen by the market makers is a deterministic function of some process Y , which solves
dYt = w(t,Yt ) dXt + b(t, Yt ) dt for some weighting function w and drift function b
chosen by the market makers (see e.g. [1, 4, 7] among others for the use of a weight-
ing function in the construction of the market makers’ signal).
Before defining what we mean precisely by an equilibrium in this model, we intro-
duce the class of admissible controls for the market makers and the informed trader.
Definition 2.2 The pair ((w,b, y),h) is an admissible pricing rule for the market
makers if for some interval (,u) ⊂ R, y ∈ (,u) and w : R+ × (,u) → (0,∞),
b : R+ × (,u) → R and h : R+ × (,u) → R are measurable functions such that
h(t, ·) is strictly increasing for every t > 0, w is bounded away from 0 on compact
subsets of R+ × (,u), and for any Brownian motion β , there exists a unique strong
solution without explosion1 to
Yt = z +
∫ t
0
w(s,Ys) dβs +
∫ t
0
b(s,Ys) ds, ∀z ∈ (,u).
Given an admissible pricing rule ((w,b, y),h), the market makers set the price on
{τ > t} to be h(t, Yt ), where Y follows
Yt = y +
∫ t
0
w(s,Ys)(dBs + dθs) +
∫ t
0
b(s,Ys) ds, (2.4)
whenever θ is an admissible strategy for the insider.
Since h is strictly monotone in y, Y is perfectly observable by the traders, in partic-
ular by the insider. In conjunction with the assumption that w is bounded away from
0 on compact subsets of R+ × (,u), this entails that the insider can observe B since
1That is, the boundary points  and u are not reached in finite time.
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she clearly knows her own strategy θ . This assumption, therefore, also ensures that
the insider’s filtration is well defined and is generated by B , Γ and (τ ∧ t)t≥0. This
is worth noting since otherwise, we may run into problems with the well-posedness
of the model as the insider’s trading strategy may depend on the observations of the
price process that is adapted to the filtration generated by X, which depends crucially
on the insider’s trading strategy.
Definition 2.3 Given an admissible pricing rule ((w,b, y),h), θ is an admissible
strategy for the insider if θ is of finite variation and the following conditions are
satisfied:
1. θ is absolutely continuous, i.e.,
θt =
∫ t
0
αs ds,
for some GI -adapted α, where GI , as discussed above, is the minimal right-
continuous filtration generated by B , Γ and (τ ∧ t)t≥0, and completed with the
(Pv)v∈R-nullsets.
2. There exists a unique strong solution to
Yt = z +
∫ t
0
w(s,Ys) dXs +
∫ t
0
b(s,Ys) ds, ∀z ∈ (,u).
3. We have the integrability condition
E
v
[∫ τ
0
h2(t, Yt ) dt
]
< ∞, ∀v ∈ supp(ν), (2.5)
where Y is the unique strong solution of (2.4).
The assumption that the strategy is absolutely continuous is without any loss of
generality, since any strategy with positive quadratic variation is necessarily subopti-
mal due to the price impact of the trades (see [1] for a proof of this fact).
Faced with an admissible pricing rule ((w,b, y),h), the insider employs an ad-
missible strategy θ and achieves
Wτ =
∫
[0,τ ]
θs dh(s,Ys) + θτ
(
Γ − h(τ,Yτ )
)
as total profit when the public announcement is made and the trading possibilities
end, where Y is the strong solution to (2.4), which exists and is unique since θ is
admissible. Note that the term θτ (Γ −h(τ,Yτ )) is due to a potential jump in the price
when the true value is revealed. Integrating by parts, we obtain the more convenient
representation
Wτ =
∫ τ
0
(
Γ − h(s,Ys)
)
αs ds.
Because she is risk-neutral, the informed trader’s goal is to maximise Ev[Wτ ] within
the class of admissible strategies.
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Definition 2.4 ((w∗, b∗, y∗), h∗, α∗) is an equilibrium if
1. ((w∗, b∗, y∗), h∗) is an admissible pricing rule for the market makers;
2. θ∗ defined by θ∗t =
∫ t
0 α
∗
s ds is an admissible trading strategy for the insider given
((w∗, b∗, y∗), h∗);
3. St = 1{τ>t}h∗(t, Y ∗t )+1{τ≤t}Γ is a GM -martingale, where Y ∗ is the unique strong
solution of (2.4) with w = w∗ and b = b∗;
4. θ∗ maximises the expected profits for the insider, that is, for all v ∈ supp(ν),
E
v
[∫ τ
0
(
v − h∗(s, Y ∗s )
)
α∗s ds
]
= sup
α∈A
E
v
[∫ τ
0
(
v − h∗(s, Y ∗s )
)
αs ds
]
,
where A is the class of all admissible strategies given the admissible pricing rule
((w∗, b∗, y∗), h∗).
Since τ is independent of Γ and B , the market makers, as well as the insider, will
not use controls that depends on τ in equilibrium. In this case, the expected value of
the final wealth of the insider will equal
E
v[Wτ ] =
∫ ∞
0
e−rsEv
[(
v − h(s,Ys)
)
αs
]
ds. (2.6)
Let us denote by FX the minimal right-continuous filtration containing the P-null-
sets with respect to which X is adapted. When the insider uses strategies that are
independent of τ , this will render X independent of τ as well. In this case, one should
expect that
St = Pt1{t<τ } + Γ 1{t≥τ },
where P is a semimartingale adapted to FX . The following proposition shows that
this is indeed the case and gives a characterisation of P in terms of Γ .
Proposition 2.5 Suppose that X is independent of τ and all FX-martingales are
continuous. Then Pt = E[Γ |FXt ], i.e., P is the FX-optional projection of Γ . In par-
ticular, P is continuous.
The proof of the above result is delegated to Appendix A. However, it is worth
mentioning here that the proof does not rely on market makers making their pric-
ing decision in a Markovian manner, i.e., Pt = h(t, Yt ), where Y follows (2.4). That
is, whatever the pricing decision is, it must satisfy Pt = E[Γ |FXt ] whenever X is
independent of τ and all FX-martingales are continuous.2
In view of the above characterisation of the pricing decision P of the market mak-
ers, we search for an equilibrium in the next section by studying the optimal trading
choices of the insider. As our focus is not on the uniqueness of the equilibrium, we
follow our intuition and consider trading strategies that are independent of τ . Ac-
cordingly, the following section establishes the existence of an equilibrium where X
is independent of τ .
2As we shall see in the next section, all FX-martingales are continuous in equilibrium. In general, a
sufficient condition for this property is E[∫ t0 α2s ds] < ∞ for all t > 0 (see [16, Corollary 8.10]).
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3 Insider’s optimisation problem and the equilibrium
3.1 Bernoulli-distributed liquidation value
In this section, we assume that Γ takes values in {0,1} as in [2] and set p := ν({1}),
i.e., the probability that the liquidation value equals 1.
Under this assumption, we shall next see that one can obtain an equilibrium where
the coefficients in (2.4), as well as the pricing function h, do not depend on time.
Consequently, the solution of the optimisation problem for the insider will be time-
homogeneous as well.
We first try to formally obtain the Bellman equations associated to the value func-
tion of the insider. To this end, as observed above, suppose that X is independent
of τ and the market makers set the price at time t on {t < τ } to be h(Yt ) for some
sufficiently smooth h, where
dYt = a(Yt ) dXt + φ(Yt ) dt.
Also recall that dXt = dBt + αt dt , where αt dt represents the infinitesimal trades of
the insider.
In view of (2.6), we may consider for the insider’s problem given that Γ = v the
value function
J (x) = sup
α
E
v
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs
(
v − h(Ys)
)
αs ds
∣∣∣∣Y0 = x
]
.
Formally, J solves
sup
α
{
1
2
a2J ′′ + J ′(aα + φ) + α(v − h) − rJ
}
= 0.
Thus, if J is three times continuously differentiable, we expect to have
aJ ′ = h − v,
1
2
a2J ′′ + J ′φ − rJ = 0.
(3.1)
The first identity yields
J ′ = h − v
a
, J ′′ = h
′
a
− h − v
a2
a′, J ′′′ = h
′′
a
−2h
′a′
a2
− (h − v)a
′′
a2
+2 (h − v)(a
′)2
a3
.
Plugging the above into the second identity yields
0 = a
2
2
h′′ + h′φ − (h − v)
(
aa′′
2
+ a
′
a
φ − φ′ + r
)
.
Since h cannot depend on Γ , we obtain for the candidate pricing rule h and the
coefficients a and φ, which will be chosen by the market makers to construct the
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price, the conditions
1
2
a2h′′ + h′φ = 0, (3.2)
1
2
a2a′′ + a′φ + (r − φ′)a = 0. (3.3)
Looking at these equations, we may guess that in equilibrium,
dYt = a(Yt ) dBYt + φ(Yt ) dt, (3.4)
where BY is a GM -Brownian motion and a and φ solve (3.3). The following result
shows that all such processes can be obtained from an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process.
Proposition 3.1 Suppose that Y is a regular one-dimensional diffusion on (,u) de-
fined by the generator
1
2
a2
d2
dx2
+ φ d
dx
,
where a > 0 and φ are two functions satisfying (3.3) on (,u). Assume further that
for any y ∈ (,u), there exists a unique weak solution of (3.4) and we have for some
c ∈ (,u) the integrability condition
f (x) :=
∫ x
c
1
a(y)
< ∞, ∀x ∈ (,u).
If Rt = f (Yt ), then R is an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with generator
A = 1
2
d2
dx2
+ (rx + δ) d
dx
, (3.5)
for some δ ∈R.
Proof Clearly, Y solves (3.4) with some Brownian motion BY . Thus, it follows from
Itô’s formula that
dRt = dBYt +
(
φ(f −1(Rt ))
σ (f −1(Rt ))
− 1
2
σ ′
(
f −1(Rt )
))
dt.
Using (3.3), one can easily check that the derivative of the function
y → φ(f
−1(y))
σ (f−1(y))
− 1
2
σ ′
(
f −1(y)
)
equals r , which yields the claim. 
In view of the above proposition, we expect the equilibrium price process to be a
function of an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process. Thus, there is no harm in choosing a ≡ 1
and φ = rx + δ for some δ ∈ R. This means that the pricing rule h will be a scale
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function of the diffusion with generator (3.5). Recall that the choice of a and φ are
made by the market makers. Thus, the market makers construct their signal Y such
that it is a transient process in equilibrium (|Yt | → ∞ when Y is defined by (3.5)).
Lemma 3.2 Define
s(x) =
√
r
π
∫ x
−∞
exp
(
− r
(
y + δ
r
)2)
dy. (3.6)
Then s is a scale function for the diffusion defined by (3.5) and satisfies the property
s(−∞) = 1 − s(∞) = 0.
Proof It is straightforward to check that As = 0. Moreover, s is the cumulative dis-
tribution function for a normal random variable, which implies the boundary condi-
tions. 
Theorem 3.3 Let E ∈F0 and consider the SDE
dYt = dBt +
(
rYt + δ + 1E s
′(Yt )
s(Yt )
− 1Ec s
′(Yt )
1 − s(Yt )
)
dt, Y0 = y ∈R,
where s is as given by (3.6). Then there exists a unique strong solution to the above.
The solution in particular satisfies
lim
t→∞Yt (ω) =
{ ∞, if ω ∈ E;
−∞, if ω ∈ Ec.
Moreover, if P[E] = s(y), we have
P[E|FYt ] = s(Yt ),
and consequently
dYt = dBYt + (rYt + δ) dt
in its own filtration, where BY is a Brownian motion.
Proof Consider an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process R with generator (3.5) on some
probability space (Ω,G, (Gt )t≥0,P ) such that there exists a set F ∈ G0 with
P [F ] = P[E]. Clearly, M := 1F s(R)s(y) + 1Fc 1−s(R)1−s(y) is a bounded martingale with
E[M0] = 1. Thus, defining Q on G by dQdP = M∞ yields the existence of a weak
solution. Moreover, the weak solution is unique in law since Mt > 0 for t > 0. The
limiting condition for Yt as t → ∞ follows from this construction of the weak so-
lution since the construction is nothing but the h-transform that achieves R∞ = ∞
(resp. R∞ = −∞) on F (resp. Fc) (see [5, II.32]).
The SDE above in fact possesses a unique strong solution. Indeed, since σ ≡ 1,
Lemma IX.3.3, Corollary IX.3.4 and Proposition IX.3.2 in [15] imply that pathwise
uniqueness holds for this SDE. Thus, in view of the celebrated result of Yamada and
Watanabe (see [12, Corollary 5.3.23]), there exists a unique strong solution.
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Moreover, using the law of the solutions obtained via the weak construction per-
formed above, we have
P[E|FYt ] =
Ey[M∞1F |FRt ]
Ey[M∞|FRt ]
,
where Ey is the expectation with respect to the product measure Py ⊗ ν, where
Py is the law of R with R0 = y and ν is the distribution of F . Since F and R are
independent, under the assumption that P[E] = s(y), we obtain
Ey[M∞1F |FRt
]
Ey[M∞|FRt ]
=
s(Rt )
s(y)
P [F ]
Ey[Mt |FRt ]
= s(Rt ),
since P [F ] = P[E] = s(y) and Ey[Mt |FRt ] = 1. Thus, a standard result from non-
linear filtering (e.g. [14, Theorem 8.1]) yields
dYt = dBYt + (rYt + δ) dt
for some FY -Brownian motion. 
We now turn to the computation of the insider’s value function. We in fact verify
in Proposition 3.5 that it is given by
J (x) :=
∫ x
s−1(v)
(
s(y) − v)dy, (3.7)
which satisfies (3.1) by construction for h = s. Moreover,
AJ(x) − rJ (x) = 1
2
s′(x) + (s(x) − v)φ(x) − r
∫ x
s−1(v)
(
s(y) − v)dy
= 1
2
s′(x) +
∫ x
s−1(v)
φ(y)s′(y) dy
= 1
2
s′(x) − 1
2
∫ x
s−1(v)
s′′(y) dy
= 0, (3.8)
since s′(s−1(v)) = 0.
Lemma 3.4 For any v ∈ {0,1}, consider the SDE
Yt = y + Bt +
∫ t
0
(
rYs + δ + 1{v=1} s
′(Yt )
s(Yt )
− 1{v=0} s
′(Yt )
1 − s(Yt )
)
ds, (3.9)
and define
Av := A +
(
1{v=1}
s′
s
− 1{v=0} s
′
1 − s
)
d
dx
.
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Then J is an r-excessive function for Av and EQv [e−rt J (Yt )] → 0 as t → ∞, where
E
Qv is the expectation operator with respect to the law of the solution of the above
SDE for the given value of v.
Proof Recall from (3.8) that AJ − rJ = 0 and observe that
AvJ − rJ = AJ − rJ +
(
1{v=1}
s′
s
− r1{v=0} s
′
1 − s
)
(s − v)
=
(
1{v=1}
s′
s
− 1{v=0} s
′
1 − s
)
(s − v) ≤ 0.
Define the nonnegative function
gv :=
(
1{v=1}
s′
s
− 1{v=0} s
′
1 − s
)
(v − s).
J will be r-excessive once we show that gv is integrable with respect to the speed
measure of the diffusion defined by Av . It follows from [5, II.31] that this measure is
given by
mv(dx) :=
(
1{v=1}s2(x) + 1{v=0}
(
1 − s(x))2) 2
s′(x)
dx.
Thus, ∫ ∞
−∞
gv(x)m
v(dx) = 2
∫ ∞
−∞
s(x)
(
1 − s(x))dx < ∞
since s is the cumulative distribution function of a normal random variable. Due to the
integral representation formula for r-excessive functions (see [5, II.30]), we thus have
J (x) =
∫ ∞
0
e−rsQvs gv(x) ds + c1ψr(x) + c2φr(x),
where (Qvt )t≥0 is the transition function for the solutions of (3.9) for a given value
of v, and φr and ψr are decreasing and increasing solutions of Avu − ru = 0, re-
spectively. We claim that c1 = c2 = 0. Indeed, suppose v = 0. Then J ′(∞) = 1 and
J (−∞) = 0. However, since  and u are natural boundaries, φr(−∞) = ∞ = ψ ′r (∞)
(see [5, II.10]), which in turn yields c1 = c2 = 0. Similar considerations yield the
same conclusion when v = 1.
Therefore,
e−rtQvt J (y) =
∫ ∞
t
e−rsQvs gv(y) ds.
But the above converges to 0 as t → ∞. Indeed, since
Qvt gv = 1{v=1}
Pt (sgv)
s
+ 1{v=0}Pt ((1 − s)gv)1 − s ,
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where (Pt )t≥0 is the transition function for the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with
generator (3.5), we have
Qvt gv(y) ≤ max
{
Pts
′(y)
s(y)
,
Pt s
′(y)
1 − s(y)
}
≤
√
r√
π
max
{
1
s(y)
,
1
1 − s(y)
}
. 
In view of the above lemma, we can now construct the optimal strategy of the
insider when the market makers use s as their pricing rule.
Proposition 3.5 Suppose that Pt = s(Yt ), where s is given by (3.6) and
Yt = y + Xt +
∫ t
0
(rYs + δ) ds,
with y ∈ R being chosen so that s(y) = p = P[Γ = 1]. Then an optimal strategy for
the insider is
αt = Γ s
′(Yt )
s(Yt )
− (1 − Γ ) s
′(Yt )
1 − s(Yt ) . (3.10)
The expected profit of the insider who uses this strategy equals J (y), where J is the
function defined in (3.7).
Proof Let J be given by (3.7) and recall from (3.8) that AJ − rJ = 0. Thus, Itô’s
formula together with integration by parts yields
e−rt J (Yt ) = J (y) +
∫ t
0
e−rs
(
h(Ys) − Γ
){dBs + αs ds},
where α is an arbitrary admissible strategy of the insider. Since h and v are bounded,
∫ t
0
e−rs
(
h(Ys) − Γ
)
dBs
is a uniformly integrable martingale. Thus, since J ≥ 0,
E
v
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs
(
v − h(Ys)
)
αs ds
]
≤ J (y),
i.e., J (y) is an upper bound for the expected profit of the insider. Observe that the
distribution of J (Yt ) under Pv depends on the choice of α. Thus, if we can find
an admissible α for which Ev[limt→∞ e−rt J (Yt )] = 0, it will be optimal. However,
Lemma 3.4 shows that if α is given by (3.10), then this limit indeed equals 0. More-
over, since h is bounded, the admissibility of α will follow as soon as
∫ t
0
|αs |ds < ∞ Pv-a.s.
Indeed, on {Γ = 1}, for every T > 0, we have
∫ T
0
E
v
[
s′(Yt )
s(Yt )
]
dt =
∫ T
0
Ey
[
s′(Rt )
s(Rt )
s(Rt )
]
dt =
∫ T
0
Ey[s′(Rt )]dt
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in view of the absolute continuity relationship between the solutions of (3.9) and
the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with generator (3.5), as observed in the proof of
Theorem 3.3. Moreover, since 0 < s < 1 and s′ is bounded, the admissibility on the
set {Γ = 1} is verified. It can be shown similarly that α is admissible on the set
{Γ = 0}. This completes the proof. 
A Markovian equilibrium for the market under consideration is given in the fol-
lowing result.
Theorem 3.6 Let a ≡ 1, φ(x) = rx + δ for some δ ∈ R, s be the function defined
in (3.6), y the unique solution of s(y) = p, and α the process given by (3.10). Then
((1, φ, y), s,α) is an equilibrium.
Proof Given this choice of σ , φ and s, we have seen in Proposition 3.5 that α is
optimal. Thus it remains to show, in view of Proposition 2.5, that
s(Yt ) = E[Γ |FXt ] = E[Γ |FYt ],
as all FX- (or, equivalently, FY -) martingales are continuous due to the fact that
the filtration is Brownian (see Corollary 3.8 for another manifestation of this fact).
However, this assertion follows easily from Theorem 3.3 since s(y) = P[Γ = 1]. 
Although the theorem above gives the impression that there is a continuum of
equilibria indexed by δ, in fact all these choices of φ lead to the same SDE for the
price. Moreover, the insider’s optimal strategy does not depend on δ when expressed
in terms of P .
Corollary 3.7 Let δ, φ and α be as in Theorem 3.6 and let P ∗ be the equilibrium
price associated to ((1, φ, y), s,α). Then P ∗ is a uniformly integrable FX-martin-
gale with P ∗∞ = Γ and
P ∗t = E[Γ ] +
∫ t
0
λ(P ∗s )
(
dBs +
(
Γ
λ(P ∗s )
P ∗s
− (1 − Γ ) λ(P
∗
s )
1 − P ∗s
)
ds
)
, (3.11)
where λ(x) = s′0(s−10 (x)) and s0 is the function in (3.6) with δ = 0. In particular, thefunction λ does not depend on δ. Moreover, the insider’s strategy in equilibrium has
the form
α∗t = Γ
λ(P ∗t )
P ∗t
− (1 − Γ ) λ(P
∗
t )
1 − P ∗t
. (3.12)
Proof Let δ ∈ R be fixed and Y = B + ∫ ·0(φ(Yt ) + αt ) dt so that P ∗t = s(Yt ), where
s is given by (3.6). Then
dP ∗t = s′(Yt )
(
dBt +
(
Γ
s′(Yt )
s(Yt )
− (1 − Γ ) s
′(Yt )
1 − s(Yt )
)
dt
)
.
Observe that P ∗0 = s(y) = E[Γ ] by the choice of y.
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Next, note that
s(x) = s0
(
x + δ
r
)
,
implying s′(x) = s′0(x + δr ), as well as s−1(x) = s−10 (x) − δr . Combining these two
observations, we then deduce that
s′
(
s−1(x)
) = s′0(s−10 (x)
)
, ∀δ ∈R.
Therefore,
dP ∗t = s′0
(
s−10 (P
∗
t )
)(
dBt +
(
Γ
s′0(s
−1
0 (P
∗
t ))
P ∗t
− (1 − Γ )s
′
0(s
−1
0 (P
∗
t ))
1 − P ∗t
)
dt
)
.
This yields, in view of the definition of λ, the dynamics of P ∗ given by (3.11).
That P ∗ is uniformly integrable follows from the boundedness of s. Its limiting
property P ∗∞ = s(Y∞) = Γ is due to Theorem 3.3.
The form of the insider’s strategy follows immediately from the corresponding
change of variable. 
In Kyle’s model with risk-neutral market makers, it is in general observed that in
equilibrium, the insider’s trades are inconspicuous, i.e., the distribution of the equi-
librium demand process equals that of the noise trades. We observe the same phe-
nomenon here.
Corollary 3.8 Consider the equilibrium described in Theorem 3.6 or Corollary 3.7
and let X∗ denote the equilibrium level of demand. Then X∗ is a Brownian motion in
its own filtration.
Proof Note that
X∗t = Bt +
∫ t
0
α∗s ds,
where α∗ is given by (3.12). Recall that the relationship between X and Y entails they
generate the same filtration. Moreover, since the pricing rule is a strictly increasing
function, we deduce that the filtrations generated by P ∗ and X∗ coincide. Therefore,
E[α∗t |FX
∗
t ] = E[α∗t |FP
∗
t ] = E[Γ |FP
∗
t ]
λ(Pt )
Pt
− (1 −E[Γ |FP ∗t ])
λ(Pt )
1 − Pt = 0
since P ∗ is a uniformly integrable FY ∗ -martingale with P ∗∞ = Γ by Corollary 3.7.
Thus, X∗ is a Brownian motion in its own filtration by [14, Theorem 8.1]. 
Since we are able to characterise the equilibrium price process as a function of
an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, this allows us to observe a deviation in equilibrium
from the original model in Kyle. In [13], as explained in [3] and [9], the recipro-
cal of the market depth follows a martingale preventing ‘systematic changes’ in the
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market depth. In the absence of such systematic changes, the insider cannot acquire
a large position when the depth is low to liquidate at a later date when the liquidity
is higher to obtain unbounded profits. The reciprocal of the market depth is called
Kyle’s lambda, and it is given by the process λ(P ∗) in our model, where λ and P ∗
are as in Corollary 3.7. The next result shows that in contrast to Kyle’s findings, the
reciprocal of the market depth follows a supermartingale, which was also observed
by Back and Baruch in [2] using different arguments.
Corollary 3.9 Let λ and P ∗ be as in Corollary 3.7. Then λ(P ∗) is a GM -super-
martingale such that limt→∞E[λ(P ∗t )] = 0, i.e., λ(P ∗) is a GM -potential.
Proof As observed earlier, suppose without loss of generality that δ = 0 so that
φ(x) = rx and the market makers’ signal Y ∗ solves in its own filtration
dY ∗t = dβt + rY ∗t dt,
where β is an FY ∗ -Brownian motion. Since P ∗ = s0(Y ∗), it suffices to show that
s′0(Y ∗) is an FY
∗
-supermartingale. Independence of τ and P ∗ will then imply that
s′0(Y ∗), hence also λ(Y ∗), is a GM -supermartingale.
Now we have
s′0(x) =
√
r
π
e−rx2 .
Thus an application of Itô’s formula yields
ds′0(Y ∗t ) = −s′0(Y ∗t )(2rY ∗t dβt + r dt),
which in turn implies that s′0(Y ∗) has the required supermartingale property. More-
over, as a consequence of the dominated convergence theorem, we obtain
lim
t→∞E[s
′
0(Y
∗
t )] = E
[
lim
t→∞ s
′
0(Y
∗
t )
]
= 0
since limt→∞ |Y ∗t | = ∞. 
Remark 3.10 In fact, the actual marginal price impact that is observed in the market
is given by λ(Pt )1{τ>t} since the price is constant from τ onwards. Note that this is
again a GM -supermartingale in view of Lemma A.1.
A simple consequence of the above result is that the market gets more liquid on
average as time passes. The reason for this deviation from Kyle is due to the random
deadline for the whole trading activities, which is independent of everything else. The
insider is aware of the fact that her informational advantage is going to end at a totally
inaccessible stopping time, which will come as a surprise. She nevertheless chooses
not to trade aggressively revealing her information quickly since, as observed by Back
and Baruch [2], the price impact is decreasing in time so that the risk of waiting can
be compensated by lower execution costs.
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Remark 3.11 The computations made in this section suggest that there is no time-
homogeneous equilibrium unless Γ has a Bernoulli distribution. Indeed, if X is in-
dependent of τ , Proposition 3.1 implies that Y is a transient Ornstein–Uhlenbeck
process. On the other hand, P∞ = Γ and the equilibrium price is given by a
scale function of Y . Consequently, P∞ can take only two different values since
Y∞ ∈ {−∞,∞}.
3.2 More general liquidation value
In this section, we consider more general distributions for Γ and suppose3 that we
have Γ d= f (η) for some continuous and strictly increasing f and a standard normal
random variable η. We can incorporate atoms and consider more general distributions
for Γ . However, this will only result in more complicated coefficients for Y ∗ in the
filtration of the insider and will not significantly alter the qualitative inferences that
one can make within this model. Thus, for simplicity of exposition and model, we
make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.12 There exists a continuous, strictly increasing function f :R→R
such that Γ d= f (η), where η is a standard normal random variable.
Remark 3.11 suggests that one cannot go beyond a Bernoulli-distributed payoff
using a time-homogeneous SDE for Y . Collin-Dufresne et al. [8] consider a similar
problem when Γ d= η and obtain an equilibrium where the coefficients of Y ∗ depend
on time by using ideas from Kalman filtering.
We next show that an equilibrium exists for more general payoff distributions. In
fact, the market makers’ equilibrium signal process Y ∗ will turn out to be just a time
change of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process that appears in the equilibrium when Γ
had a Bernoulli distribution as in the last section. To wit, let us suppose
dYt = σ(t)a(Yt ) dXt + σ 2(t)φ(Yt ) dt,
where σ : R+ → R+. Following similar arguments as in the beginning of Sect. 3.1,
we obtain after obvious modifications
ht + 12a
2σ 2hyy + σ 2φhy = 0, (3.13)
1
2
aσ 2a′′ + φσ 2 a
′
a
− σ 2φ′ + σ
′
σ
+ r = 0.
It is easy to check that when σ ≡ 1, the above equations reduce to (3.2) and (3.3).
As in the previous section, we choose a ≡ 1 and φ(x) = rx. This implies
σ ′
σ(1 − σ)(1 + σ) = −r. (3.14)
3 d= stands for equality in distribution.
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Since
1
x(1 − x)(1 + x) =
1
x
+ 1
2(1 − x) −
1
2(1 + x) ,
integrating (3.14) yields
σ 2(t)
1 − σ 2(t) = C
2e−2rt
for some constant C to be determined later. Thus we can solve the above to deduce
σ 2(t) = C
2e−2rt
1 + C2e−2rt . (3.15)
The next lemma defines a function which later turns out to be the value function for
the insider.
Lemma 3.13 Let h : R+ × R → R satisfy (3.13) and be such that h(t, ·) is strictly
increasing for each t ≥ 0. Consider
J (t, y) :=
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x) − v
σ(t)
dx + 1
2
ert
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ (s)hy
(
s, h−1(s, v)
)
ds,
where h−1(t, ·) represents the inverse of h(t, ·) for every t ≥ 0. Then we have
Jt + 12σ
2(t)Jyy + σ 2(t)ryJy − rJ = 0,
provided that
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ (s)hy
(
s, h−1(s, v)
)
ds < ∞, ∀t ≥ 0.
Proof Direct differentiation yields
Jt =
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
ht (t, x)
σ (t)
dx −
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x) − v
σ 2(t)
σ ′(t) dx
+ re
rt
2
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ (s)hy
(
s, h−1(s, v)
)
ds − 1
2
σ(s)hy
(
t, h−1(t, v)
)
= −σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(
1
2
hyy(t, x) + hy(t, x)rx
)
dx −
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x) − v
σ 2(t)
σ ′(t) dx
+ re
rt
2
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ (s)hy
(
s, h−1(s, v)
)
ds − 1
2
σ(s)hy
(
t, h−1(t, v)
)
= σ(t)
2
(
hy
(
t, h−1(t, v)
) − hy(t, y)
)
−
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
h(t, x) − v
σ 2(t)
σ ′(t) dx
− σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
hy(t, x)rx dx + re
rt
2
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ (s)hy
(
s, h−1(s, v)
)
ds
− 1
2
σ(t)hy
(
t, h−1(t, v)
)
.
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Thus,
Jt + AJ − rJ = σ(t)ry
(
h(t, y) − v) −
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(h(t, x) − v)(rσ + σ ′(t))
σ (t)
dx
− σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
hy(t, x)rx dx
= σ(t)ry(h(t, y) − v) − rσ (t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(
h(t, x) − v)dx
−σ(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
hy(t, x)rx dx
= 0,
where the last equality follows from integration by parts. 
The PDE (3.13) satisfied by h indicates that the market makers’s signal in equilib-
rium will be a time-changed Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process, where the time change is
given by
V (t) :=
∫ t
0
σ 2(s) ds = 1
2r
log
1 + C2
1 + C2e−2rt . (3.16)
Indeed, any solution of (3.13) can be obtained by a time change as we see in the next
lemma.
Lemma 3.14 Suppose that a ≡ 1 and φ(x) = rx. Then h is a solution of (3.13) if
and only if g defined by
g(t, y) := h(V −1(t), y),
where V is the absolutely continuous function given in (3.16), solves
gt + 12gyy + rygy = 0.
Proof Note that h(t, y) = g(V (t), y). Since dV (t) = σ 2(t) dt , the claim follows. 
Consistently with the findings of the previous section, the insider should construct
a bridge process Y ∗ such that limt→∞ h∗(t, Y ∗t ) = Γ and Y ∗ in its own filtration
follows
dY ∗t = σ(t) dBYt + rσ 2(t)Y ∗t dt,
i.e., a time-changed version of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process with generator (3.5),
where δ = 0. As observed in the previous lemma, the time change is given by the
function V (t) which converges to V (∞) = 12r log(1 + C2) < ∞. This implies that
the distribution of Y ∗∞ equals that of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process defined by (3.5)
at V (∞) with δ = 0. This distribution is Gaussian and allows us to go beyond a
Bernoulli distribution for Γ .
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Let p(t, x, y) be the transition density of the Ornstein–Uhlenbeck process defined
by (3.5) with δ = 0. It is well known that
p(t, x, y) = q
(
e2rt − 1
2r
, y − xert
)
,
where q(t, x) = 1√
2πt
e− x
2
2t
. The next theorem defines the bridge process that is the
key to the insider’s strategy in equilibrium.
Theorem 3.15 Let f be the function in Assumption 3.12 and assume C2 = 2r . Then
for any v ∈R, there exists a unique strong solution to
Yt =
∫ t
0
σ(s) dBs + r
∫ t
0
f −1(v) − Ys cosh( 12 log(1 + 2re−2rs))
sinh( 12 log(1 + 2re−2rs))
σ 2(s) ds,
where σ > 0 is defined via (3.15). Moreover, limt→∞ Yt = f −1(v) Qv-a.s., where Qv
is the law of the solution. Moreover,
E
Q
v [F(Ys; s ≤ t)] = E
Q[p(V (∞) − V (t), Yt , f −1(v))F (Ys; s ≤ t)]
p(V (∞),0, f −1(v)) ,
where F is a bounded measurable function and Q is the law of the unique solution to
Yt =
∫ t
0
σ(s) dBs + r
∫ t
0
σ 2(s)Ys ds. (3.17)
Proof The existence and uniqueness of the solution follow immediately since the
SDE has Lipschitz coefficients in every compact interval [0, T ].
Next observe that
1
2
log(1 + 2re−2rt ) = r(V (∞) − V (t)).
Thus, if we define Rt := YV −1(t), we obtain
Rt =
∫ V −1(t)
0
σ(s) dBs + r
∫ t
0
f −1(v) − Rs cosh (r(V (∞) − s))
sinh (r(V (∞) − s)) ds.
On the other hand, βt :=
∫ V −1(t)
0 σ(s) dBs is a local martingale with respect to the fil-
tration (Gt )t≥0, where Gt :=FV −1(t). Moreover, [β,β]t = t for each t ≥ 0. Therefore,
β is a G-Brownian motion. Consequently,
Rt = βt + r
∫ t
0
f −1(v) − Rs cosh (r(V (∞) − s))
sinh (r(V (∞) − s)) ds, t < V (∞).
However, the above is the SDE for
ρt = Wt + r
∫ t
0
ρs ds
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conditioned on the event {ρV (∞) = f −1(v)}. Indeed, the SDE representation of this
Markovian bridge follows from [10, Example 2.3], which coincides with the above
SDE since F(t) = ert and Σ(s, t) = e2rt−12r , where F and Σ are the functions defined
in [10, Example 2.3]. Therefore, Rt → f−1(v) as t → V (∞), which is equivalent to
Yt → f−1(v) as t → ∞.
The absolute continuity relationship is a consequence of [10, Theorem 2.2] since
the solution of (3.17) is a Markov process with transition density p(V (t)−V (s),y,z).

We are now ready to state the existence of an equilibrium in the next theorem,
whose proof is postponed to Appendix B.
Theorem 3.16 Suppose C2 = 2r and assume that there exist positive constants
K > 0 and k < 11+2r such that
|f (y)| ≤ Ke ky
2
4 .
Define
g(t, y) :=
∫ ∞
−∞
f (z)p
(
V (∞) − t, y, z)dz
and let h∗(t, y) = g(V (t), y). Then ((σ ∗, φ∗,0), h∗, α∗) is an equilibrium, where σ ∗
is the positive square root of (3.15) with C2 = 2r , φ∗(y) = ry, and
α∗(t) = rσ ∗(t)
(
f −1(Γ ) − Y ∗t cosh( 12 log(1 + 2re−2rt ))
sinh( 12 log(1 + 2re−2rt ))
− Y ∗t
)
.
Moreover,
Y ∗t =
∫ t
0
σ ∗(s) dB∗s + r
∫ t
0
(
σ ∗(s)
)2
Y ∗s ds, (3.18)
where B∗ is an FY ∗ -Brownian motion.
As in the time-homogeneous case, Kyle’s lambda will be a uniformly integrable
supermartingale. However, in contrast to the time-homogeneous case, it does not dis-
appear as t → ∞, i.e., it is not a potential in general.
Proposition 3.17 Consider the equilibrium given in Theorem 3.16 and define the
process λ∗t := h∗y(t, Y ∗t ). Then λ∗ is a uniformly integrable (FY ∗ ,P)-supermartingale
and
lim
t→∞E[λ
∗
t ] =
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z) 1√
2π
e−
z2
2 dz. (3.19)
Proof Define u(t, y) = h∗y(t, y). Differentiating
h∗t +
σ 2(t)
2
h∗yy + σ 2(t)ryh∗y = 0
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with respect to y yields
ut + σ
2(t)
2
uyy + σ 2(t)ryuy = −rσ 2(t)u.
Applying Itô’s formula to u and Y ∗, which satisfies (3.18), yields
dλ∗t = uy(t, Y ∗t )σ ∗(t) dB∗t − r
(
σ ∗(t)
)2
λ∗t dt.
Since λ∗ ≥ 0, the stochastic integral in the above decomposition is a supermartingale,
which leads to the desired supermartingale property of λ∗.
It follows from (B.1) that
u(t, y) =
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z)p
(
V (∞) − V (t), y, z)dz.
Thus, λ∗∞ := limt→∞ λ∗t = f ′(Y ∗∞)P-a.s. and
E[u(t, Y ∗t )] =
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z)p
(
V (∞),0, z)dz
by the Chapman–Kolmogorov equation. Therefore,
lim
t→∞E[u(t, Y
∗
t )] =
∫ ∞
−∞
f ′(z)p
(
V (∞),0, z)dz = E[f ′(Y ∗∞)] = E[λ∗∞].
This implies that λ∗ is a uniformly integrable supermartingale. (3.19) follows from
the fact that Y ∗∞ is standard normal. 
Remark 3.18 As in Corollary 3.8, one can show that the insider’s trades are incon-
spicuous, i.e., X∗ is a Brownian motion in its own filtration. This directly follows
from the equilibrium level of Y ∗ which satisfies (3.18).
4 Conclusion
Using tools from potential theory for one-dimensional diffusions, we have solved a
version of the Kyle model with general payoffs when the announcement date has
an exponential distribution and is independent of all other parameters of the model.
It is shown that a stationary equilibrium exists only if the payoff has a Bernoulli
distribution, which corresponds to the special case considered in [2]. The approach
considered here is novel in its study and characterisation of the optimal strategies of
the insider in terms of excessive functions of an associated diffusion process. In par-
ticular, the so-called Kyle’s lambda, which is a measurement of liquidity, is identified
with a potential.
As in the earlier literature on the Kyle model, we have shown that the total demand
for the asset in equilibrium has the same distribution as that of the noise traders,
i.e., the insider’s trades are inconspicuous. What is different from the earlier models,
however, is that the equilibrium prices no longer converge to the payoff Γ as time
approaches the announcement date. That is, there is a jump in the price when Γ
becomes public knowledge. This is due to the fact that the announcement comes as
a surprise even for the insider and therefore, she is not able to construct a bridge of
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random length τ for the demand process in order for the prices to converge to Γ (cf.
the bridge construction in [7]). However, in equilibrium, she trades in such a way that
the price process conditioned on no announcement, i.e., P , converges to Γ .
It will be interesting to see how these conclusions, especially the last one, change
if the announcement date τ is no longer assumed to be independent of the other
variables. However, this would require a framework beyond the scope of the current
paper and is left for future study.
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Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 2.5
Recall that we are searching for a decomposition
St = Pt1{t<τ } + Γ 1{t≥τ },
where P is a semimartingale adapted to FX . In order for P to be a candidate price
process, one must have that S is a GM -martingale. To this end, the following lemma
will be crucial.
Lemma A.1 Define
Nt := Γ 1{t≥τ } − r
∫ t
0
1{s<τ }E[Γ |FXs ]ds,
Mt := 1{t≥τ } − r
∫ t
0
1{s<τ } ds.
Then N and M are GM -martingales.
Proof Note that for s < t ,
E[Nt |GMs ] = 1{τ≤s}E
[
Γ − r
∫ τ
0
E[Γ |FXu ]du
∣∣∣∣GMs
]
+ 1{τ>s}E
[
Γ 1{t≥τ } − r
∫ t
0
1{u<τ }E[Γ |FXu ]du
∣∣∣∣GMs
]
= 1{τ≤s}Ns + 1{τ>s}
(
E[Γ |FXs ](1 − e−r(t−s)) − r
∫ s
0
E[Γ |FXu ]du
)
− 1{τ>s}E
[∫ t
s
r1{u<τ }E[Γ |FXu ]du
∣∣∣∣GMs
]
= 1{τ≤s}Ns + 1{τ>s}
(
E[Γ |FXs ](1 − e−r(t−s)) − r
∫ s
0
E[Γ |FXu ]du
)
− 1{τ>s}
∫ t
s
re−r(u−s)E[Γ |FXs ]du
= Ns,
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where the second and third equalities are due to the independence of X and τ .
The proof for the martingale property of M follows along similar lines. 
In view of the above lemma, in order for S to be a GM -martingale, one needs to
show that
Ut := Pt1{t<τ } + r
∫ t
0
1{s<τ }E[Γ |FXs ]ds
is a GM -martingale. This leads to
Proof of Proposition 2.5 Suppose that the semimartingale decomposition of P is
given by Pt = P0 + Zt + At , where Z is a continuous local martingale and A is a
predictable process of finite variation.4 Let
Ut = Pt1{t<τ } + r
∫ t
0
1{s<τ }E[Γ |FXs ]ds.
Then in view of the previous lemma, we have
dUt = 1{t≤τ }(dZt + dAt) − Pt−(dMt + r1{t<τ } dt)
+ r1{t<τ }E[Γ |FXt ]dt − Aτ 1{t=τ }
= 1{t≤τ } dZt − Pt− dMt + 1{t<τ } dAt + r1{t<τ }(E[Γ |FXt ] − Pt) dt.
Consequently,
∫ t
0
(
1{s<τ } dAs + r1{s<τ }(E[Γ |FXs ] − Ps) ds
)
is a predictable local martingale of finite variation. Thus,
1{t<τ } dAt = 1{t<τ }r(Pt −E[Γ |FXt ]) dt.
Since τ is independent of FX and P[τ > t] > 0 for all t ≥ 0, this yields
dAt = r(Pt −E[Γ |FXt ]) dt.
Thus A is continuous and so is P . Consider
τn := inf{t ≥ 0 : |Zt | > n}.
Since Z is continuous, τn → ∞ P-a.s.
Next, let Γˆt = E[Γ |FXt ] and consider σn := inf{t ≥ 0 : |Pt − Γˆt | > n}, which
converges to ∞ due to the continuity of P and Γˆ . Then
Pt∧τn∧σm − Γˆt∧τn∧σm − r
∫ t∧τn∧σm
0
(Ps − Γˆs) ds
4Under the assumption that all martingales are continuous, the optional and predictable σ -algebras coin-
cide.
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is a martingale for each n and m. Moreover, denoting the semimartingale local time
of P − Γˆ at 0 by L, we deduce that
|Pt∧τn∧σm − Γˆt∧τn∧σm | − r
∫ t∧τn∧σm
0
|Pu − Γˆu|du − Lt∧τn∧σm (A.1)
is a G-local martingale and thus a submartingale, being bounded from above.
Also, note that since S is a uniformly integrable martingale as observed in the
proof of Proposition 2.1, since 1{τ>t}|Pt | ≤ St and since τ is independent of P , the
family (Pt∧τn∧σm)n≥1,m≥1 is uniformly integrable. Thus we obtain for s < t
E[|Pt − Γˆt ||FXs ] ≥ |Ps − Γˆs | + r
∫ t
s
E[|Pu − Γˆu||FXs ]du
after taking limits as n → ∞ and m → ∞ and using the monotone convergence theo-
rem on the integral in (A.1), as well as the fact that L is increasing. A straightforward
application of Gronwall’s inequality therefore implies that for any t > s,
E
[|Pt − Γˆt |∣∣FXs ] ≥ |Ps − Γˆs |er(t−s). (A.2)
On the other hand,
1{τ>s}E
[|St − Γ |∣∣GMs ] = 1{τ>s}E[1τ>t |Pt − Γ |
∣∣GMs ]
= 1{τ>s}e−r(t−s)E
[|Pt − Γ |∣∣FXs ]
≥ 1{τ>s}e−r(t−s)E
[|Pt − Γˆt |∣∣FXs ],
where the last inequality follows from Jensen’s inequality since Pt is FXt -measurable.
However, (A.2) then yields
lim
t→∞ 1{τ>s}E
[|St − Γ |∣∣GMs ] ≥ limt→∞|Ps − Γˆs | = |Ps − Γˆs |,
which contradicts (2.3) unless Ps = Γˆs P-a.s. Since P and Γˆ are continuous, the
nullset can be chosen to be independent of s, which completes the proof. 
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 3.16
We show that ((σ ∗, φ∗,0), h∗, α∗) is an equilibrium by checking 1) α∗ is admissi-
ble and optimal given (σ ∗, φ∗,0), and 2) (σ ∗, φ∗,0) is an admissible pricing rule
given α∗.
Step 1. Insider’s optimality. In view of Lemma 3.13, let us first verify that
∫ ∞
t
e−rsσ ∗(s)h∗y
(
s, h−1(s, v)
)
ds < ∞, ∀t ≥ 0.
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To see this, first observe that h∗y(s, h−1(s, v)) = 1dh−1(s,y)
dy
and
y =
∫ ∞
−∞
f (z)p
(
V (∞) − V (t), h−1(t, y), z)dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f (z)p
(
1
2r
log(1 + 2re−2rt ), h−1(t, y), z
)
dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f (z)q
(
e−2rt , z − h−1(t, y)
√
1 + 2re−2rt)dz. (B.1)
Due to the bound on f , we can differentiate inside the integral to get
0 <
1
dh−1(s,y)
dy
=
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f (z)
z − h−1(t, y)√1 + 2re−2rt
e−2rt
× q(e−2rt , z − h−1(t, y)√1 + 2re−2rt)dz
=
√
1 + 2re−2rt
∫ ∞
−∞
f
(
z + h−1(t, y)
√
1 + 2re−2rt) z
e−2rt
q(e−2rt , z) dz
≤ C exp
(
k
2
(
h−1(t, y)
)2
(1 + 2r)
)
e3rt
∫ ∞
0
z√
2π
exp
(
−z
2
2
(e2rt − k)
)
dz
= C exp
(
k
2
(
h−1(t, y)
)2
(1 + 2r)
)
e3rt
e2rt − k
∼ C exp
(
k
2
(
h−1(t, y)
)2
(1 + 2r)
)
ert as t → ∞, (B.2)
where C above (and also throughout the proof) is a constant independent of t that may
change from line to line. Moreover, h−1(t, y) = g−1(V (t), y) is bounded for fixed y
since V (∞) < ∞ and g(, ·, y) is strictly increasing and continuous on [0,V (∞)] for
each y. Thus the above asymptotic establishes that the condition is verified since
∫ ∞
0
σ ∗(s) < ∞.
Thus, for any admissible α, we have
e−rt J (t, Yt ) = J (0,0) +
∫ t
0
e−rs
(
h(s,Ys) − Γ
)
(dBs + αs ds)
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due to the fact that Jt + AJ − rJ = 0 by Lemma 3.13. In view of the admissibility
condition (2.5), (∫ t
0
e−rs
(
h(s,Ys) − Γ
)
dBs
)
t≥0
is a uniformly integrable martingale that converges in L1(Pv). Thus, if e−rt J (t, Yt )
has a limit in L1(Pv) as t → ∞, then
E
v
[∫ ∞
0
e−rs
(
h(s,Ys) − Γ
)
αs ds
]
= J (0,0) −Ev
[
lim
t→∞ e
−rt J (t, Yt )
]
.
Since J ≥ 0, the process α will be the optimal strategy if it achieves
lim
t→∞ e
−rt J (t, Yt ) = 0.
To see that the above limit holds in L1(Pv), first note that
e−rt 1
σ ∗(t)
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(
h(t, x) − v)dx ≤
√
1 + 2r√
2r
∫ y
h−1(t,v)
(
h(t, x) − v)dx
≤
√
1 + 2r√
2r
(
h(t, y) − v)(y − h−1(t, v)) (B.3)
due to (3.15) and the fact that h is increasing in y. Thus, limt→∞ e−rt J (t, Yt ) = 0
P
v
-a.s. if we have Yt − h−1(t, v) → 0 Pv-a.s. However, Theorem 3.15 shows that
α∗ yields that limt→∞ Y ∗t = f −1(v) = limt→∞ h−1(t, v) Pv-a.s. Therefore if we
have supt≥0 Ev[|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε + |Y ∗t |2+] < ∞ for some  > 0, we can conclude
that e−rt J (t, Yt ) converges to 0 in L1(Pv) as t → ∞ in view of (B.3). Note that
supt≥0 Ev[(h∗(t, Y ∗t ))2] < ∞ will also imply that α∗ is admissible.
We first show that Ev[|Y ∗t |2+ε] is bounded. Indeed, in view of the absolute conti-
nuity relationship established in Theorem 3.15, we have
E
v[|Y ∗t |2+ε] = EQ
[ |Y ∗t |2+εp(V (∞) − V (t), Y ∗t , f −1(v))
p(V (∞),0, f −1(v))
]
= 1√
2πp(V (∞),0, f −1(v))
×
∫ ∞
−∞
ert |y|2+εp(V (∞) − V (t), y, f −1(v)) exp
(
− y
2
2e−2rt
)
dy
≤ Ce−rt
∫ ∞
−∞
|y|εp(V (∞) − V (t), y, f −1(v))dy
≤ C.
Above, the third line follows from the boundedness of xe−x on (0,∞) and the last
line is due to the finiteness of V (∞).
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To show supt≥0 Ev[|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε] < ∞, first note that
|h(t, y)| ≤ C exp
(
k
2
y2(1 + 2r)
)∫ ∞
−∞
ert√
2π
exp
(
−z
2
2
(e2rt − k)
)
dz
≤ C exp
(
k
2
y2(1 + 2r)
)
ert√
e2rt − k
≤ C exp
(
k
2
y2(1 + 2r)
)
,
in view of the exponential bound on f and similar arguments as those for (B.2).
Therefore, setting kε = k(1 + /2),
E
v[|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε]
≤ C
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
kεz2(1 + 2r))q(e−2rs , f −1(v) − z√1 + 2re−2rs)
× q
(
1
1 + 2re−2rs , z
)
dz
≤ C
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
z2
(
(1 + 2r)kε − 1 + 2re
−2rs
2
))
× q(e−2rs , f −1(v) − z√1 + 2re−2rs)dz
≤ C
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
(
z2e−2rs
( (1 + 2r)kε
1 + 2re−2rs −
1
2
))
exp
(
− (f
−1(v)ers − z)2
2
)
dz
≤ C exp
((
f −1(v)
)2 m(s)
1 − 2e−2rsm(s)
)
,
where
m(s) := k
ε(1 + 2r)
1 + 2re−2rs −
1
2
<
1
2
if  > 0 is chosen small enough. This completes the proof that Ev[|h∗(s, Y ∗s )|2+ε] is
bounded. Hence, α∗ is an admissible optimal strategy.
Step 2. Market makers’ best response. Recall that
h∗(t, y) =
∫ ∞
−∞
f (z)q(e−2rt , z − y
√
1 + 2re−2rt ) dz
=
∫ ∞
−∞
f (z + y
√
1 + 2re−2rt )q(e−2rt , z) dz,
which shows that h∗ is strictly increasing in y since f is. All that remains to show
now is that (h∗(t, Y ∗t )) is an (FY
∗
t ,P)-martingale converging to f (v).
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It follows from Theorem 3.15 and the disintegration formula (2.1) that for any
bounded and measurable F , we have
E[F(Y ∗t )|FY
∗
s ] =
∫
R
E
v[F(Y ∗t )|FY
∗
s ]ν(dv)
=
∫
R
E
Q[F(Yt )p(V (∞) − V (t), Yt , f −1(v))|FYs ]
p(V (∞) − V (t), Ys, f −1(v)) ν(dv).
As we did before, let Rt = YV −1(t), where Y is the solution of (3.17). Thus
dRt = dβt + rRt dt
for some Brownian motion β , which in particular implies that Yt under Q is normal
with mean 0 and variance equalling
e2rV (t) − 1
2r
= 1
1 + 2re−2rt .
Thus,
E[F(Y ∗t )|FY
∗
s ]
=
∫
R
E
Q[F(RV (t))p(V (∞) − V (t),RV (t), f−1(v))|FYs ]
p(V (∞) − V (t),RV (s), f −1(v)) ν(dv)
=
∫
R
∫
R
f (y)
p(V (∞) − V (t), y, f −1(v))p(V (t) − V (s),RV (s), y)
p(V (∞) − V (s),RV (s), f −1(v)) dy ν(dv)
=
∫
R
E
Q[F(RV (t))|RV (s),RV (∞) = f −1(v)]ν(dv)
= EQ[F(RV (t))|RV (s)],
where the last line is due to the fact that RV (∞) is a standard normal random variable
due to the choice of C2, and f −1(Γ ) has a standard normal distribution by Assump-
tion 3.12. Thus the processes Y ∗ and RV (·) have the same law. This implies that Y ∗
satisfies (3.18), and in particular, (h∗(t, Y ∗t )) is an (FY
∗
t ,P)-martingale. The conver-
gence is immediate since limt→∞ Y ∗t = v Pv-a.s. by Theorem 3.15. 
References
1. Back, K.: Insider trading in continuous time. Rev. Financ. Stud. 5, 387–409 (1992)
2. Back, K., Baruch, S.: Information in securities markets: Kyle meets Glosten and Milgrom. Economet-
rica 72, 433–465 (2004)
3. Back, K., Cao, C.H., Willard, G.A.: Imperfect competition among informed traders. J. Finance 55,
2117–2155 (2000)
4. Back, K., Pedersen, H.: Long-lived information and intraday patterns. J. Financ. Mark. 1, 385–402
(1998)
5. Borodin, A.N., Salminen, P.: Handbook of Brownian Motion—Facts and Formulae, 2nd edn.
Birkhäuser, Basel (2012)
126 U. Çetin
6. Campi, L., Çetin, U.: Insider trading in an equilibrium model with default: a passage from reduced
form to structural modelling. Finance Stoch. 11, 591–602 (2007)
7. Campi, L., Çetin, U., Danilova, A.: Dynamic Markov bridges motivated by models of insider trading.
Stoch. Process. Appl. 121, 534–567 (2011)
8. Collin-Dufresne, P., Fos, V., Muravyev, D.: Informed trading and option prices: evidence from activist
trading. Swiss Finance Institute Research Paper No. 15-55 (2015). Available online at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2675866
9. Çetin, U., Danilova, A.: Markovian Nash equilibrium in financial markets with asymmetric informa-
tion and related forward–backward systems. Ann. Appl. Probab. 26, 1996–2029 (2016)
10. Çetin, U., Danilova, A.: Markov bridges: SDE representation. Stoch. Process. Appl. 126, 651–679
(2016)
11. Foster, F.D., Viswanathan, S.: Strategic trading when agents forecast the forecasts of others. J. Finance
51, 1437–1478 (1996)
12. Karatzas, I., Shreve, S.E.: Brownian Motion and Stochastic Calculus, 2nd edn. Springer, Berlin (1991)
13. Kyle, A.S.: Continuous auctions and insider trading. Econometrica 53, 1315–1335 (1985)
14. Liptser, R.S., Shiryaev, A.N.: Statistics of Random Processes, 2nd edn. Springer, Berlin (2001)
15. Revuz, D., Yor, M.: Continuous Martingales and Brownian Motion, 3rd revised edn. Springer, Berlin
(1999)
16. Rogers, L.C.G., Williams, D.: Diffusions, Markov Processes, and Martingales. Vol. 1, Foundations.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (2000). (Reprint of the second (1994) edition)
